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NOTES
The National War Labor Board and the National Labor
Relations Act
When the National War Labor Board I undertook to adjust "labor
disputes which might interrupt work which contributes to the effective
prosecution of the war," 2 it found an administrative agency, the National
bor Relations Board I already exercising jurisdiction over specific types
of industrial conflicts. The National Labor Relations Act had established
the NLRB to enforce the elimination of certain employer obstructions to
the development among workers of freely chosen unions,' and to assist in
the determination of what labor organizations the employees desire as their
t. Hereafter referred to as the NWLB or the Board.
When rearmament production stimulated demands for higher wages, which, ending
in strikes, threatened defense schedules, the President, by Executive Order No. 8716, 6
FED. REG. 1532 (1941), established on March 19, 1941, the National Defense Mediation
Board to adjust labor disputes by assisting the parties to negotiate agreements, by
affording means for voluntary arbitration, and by investigating issues and making pub-
lic findings of fact. The Executive Order did not purport to make the findings or
recommendations binding upon the parties, and theoretically, the Board was merely a
mediatory body. Consequently, the function of the Mediation Board in a situation
where the National Labor Relations Act provided the ultimate remedy, was to arrange
a truce while the appointed agency proceeded to adjudicate. If a representation issue
was involved, the Mediation Board referred the dispute to the NLRB, usually append-
ing a request to expedite the case as provided by § 2 (e) of the Executive Order. See
Report on the Work of the National Defense Mcdiation Board, Bulletin No. 714,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Labor (1942).
The resignation of the C. I. 0. members as a result of the award in the Captive
Mines case, MB No. 2013, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 287 (1941), doomed the National Defense
Mediation Board. However, the subsequent declaration of war brought an even more
imperative need for the orderly settlement of industrial conflicts. Consequently, the
President called a conference of the leaders of capital and labor who agreed that there
should be no strikes and lockouts, but that all disputes should be settled by peaceful
means through a War Labor Board. Executive Order No. 9017, 7 Fa. REG. 279
(1942), issued Jinuary 12, 1942, established in the Office for Emergency Management
a National War Labor Board, empowered to finally determine by mediation or arbi-
tration, under rules established by the Board, any labor dispute which might interrupt
work which contributes to the effective prosecution of the war. Thus the NWLB
possesses not only mediatory discretion but the power to render compulsory decisions
expressed in "directives" to the proper parties. By Executive Order No. 9250, 7 FED.
REG. 7871 (1942), issued October 3, 1942, the NWLB must approve all wage increases
or decreases. Recently Congress statutorily recognized the NWLB by conferring upon
it certain powers and defining its jurisdiction in the War Labor Defense Act. Pub. L
No. 89, 78th Cong., st Sess. (June 25, 1943) c. 144.
2. Executive Order No. 9o7, 7 FED. REG. 279 (1942), issued January 12, 1942.
3. Hereafter referred to as the NLRB.
The National Labor Relations Board was established by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, commonly cited as the Wagner Act, passed on July 5, 1935. 49 STAT. 449
(1935), -,9 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-166 (942). The Act purports "to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encourag-
ing the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association." § i.
4. Such "unfair labor practices" consist of interference with employees in the
exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining; domination or in-
terference with the formation or administration of any labor organization; discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in a union; discrimination against an employee because he had filed charges under the
Act; refusal to bargain collectively with the representatives of the employees.
(196)
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collective bargaining agents, but left the settlement of disputes over terms
or conditions of employment outside the domain of the NLRB.' On the
other hand, the NWLB is concerned with the peaceful adjustment of all
labor controversies, regardless of their nature, including questions of col-
lective representation and unfair labor practices. We are interested in the
process whereby two governmental bodies, one a peace-time administrative
agency, intent solely on guaranteeing freedom of collective economic action
to employees, and the other, an emergency war board, bent on obtaining the
maximum in production, succeeded, despite divergent aims, in reaching a
mnodus vivendi, thereby satisfactorily eliminating a threatened conflict -over
jurisdiction. Since the powers and procedure of the NLRB were carefully
defined by Congress and minutely crystallized by subsequent practice, the
story of this adjustment perforce is found in the decisions of the flexible,
comparatively unfettered NWLB.
The executive order establishing the NWLB contains certain limita-
tions upon the powers of the Board. Section 2 provides that established
procedures for adjustment or settlement must first be exhausted; 6 section 7
keeps enumerated acts of Congress, including the National Labor Relations
Act, intact.' Naturally, the construction of these restrictions would deter-
mine, to a measurable extent, the "field" of the Board's authority. Prac-
tically, however, the NWLB was free to give its own interpretation,$ and,
by stressing the raison d' 3lre of its powers, the need for continuous, unin-
terrupted war production, a broad jurisdiction was asserted. Thus Dean
Morse, meeting the statement that the NWLB could not compel the negotia-
tion of a contract, projected an authority over the vast majority of labor
controversies.
"The objections to the jurisdiction of the Board overlook the fact
that there is inherent in the war powers of the President the authority
to take such steps as may be necessary to prevent and settle labor
disputes which threaten to disrupt the successful prosecution of the
war. . . . It is immaterial that in peacetime the parties might con-
ceivably be justified in raising some legal objection to the enforcement
of an arbitration award of which they do not approve. In wartime,
there is no basis for questioning the power of the President to order
what amounts to compulsory arbitration for the settlement of any
labor dispute . . . which threatens the war effort."'
Furthermore, sections 2 and 7 enunciated not substantive but merely pro-
cedural qualifications.
5. See Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law
(1941) 39 'MIcH. L. Ray. xo65, and Ward, The Mechanics of Collective Bargaining
(1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 754.
6. "This Order does not apply to labor disputes for which procedure for adjust-
ment or settlement are otherwise provided until those procedures have been exhausted."
7. "Nothing herein shall be construed as superseding or in conflict with the pro-
visions of . . . the National Labor Relations Act."
8. Montgomery Ward Co., No. x92, x WAR LAB. REP. 280 (1942). "It is to be
noted that the national understanding with the President agreed to by representa-
tives of labor and industry covers all labor disputes. It is also to be noted that the
question of determining what disputes may interrupt work which contributes to the
effective prosecution of the war is left to the judgment and discretion of the War La-
bor Board." At 285. The effect of the War Labor Defense Act on the jurisdiction
of the NWLB is discussed in Montgomery Ward Co, No. 393o-D, 10 WAR LAB. REP.
415 (Aug. 2o, 1943).
9. Bethlehem Steel Corp., et al. and United Steel Workers of America, Nos. 30.
3T, 34, 35, 1 WAR LAB. Rap. 325, 350, 351 (1942).
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"The Executive Order makes clear that the effect of the dispute upon
the war effort and not the subject matter of the dispute is the criterion
which determines the Board's jurisdiction." 10 Section 7 "does not
place a limitation upon the power of the Board finally to determine
on their merits whatever issues may arise in a labor dispute, but
rather, when read in conjunction with Section 2 of the order, it places
a procedural limitation upon the War Labor Board in that procedures
of other existing agencies for the settlement of labor disputes shall be
exhausted before the War Labor Board takes jurisdiction." It
Theoretically, at least, the NWLB is thus the final tribunal for all labor
controversies, even those ordinarily within the scope of the NLRB. The
Board has gone even further, stating that since the "National Labor Rela-
tions Act is solely for the protection of employees, ... and not for the
benefit of employers who may prefer that tribunal, ... the aggrieved
employee has a choice of remedies and is not remitted exclusively to the
National Labor Relations Board for relief if he elects to pursue his other
remedy." 12 Seemingly, the NWLB announces, not only secondary juris-
diction, but, as will appear later,"3 concurrent original jurisdiction with
the NLRB in certain instances. However, despite sweeping assertions of
legal capacity, in actual practice the jurisdiction of the NLRB remained
comparatively unimpaired.
CERTIFICATION
The need for some adjustment becomes apparent as we face the facts
in the Virginia Electric and Power Co. case,' the first NWLB decision
involving the National Labor Relations Act. In 1937, the utility negotiated
a contract with the Independent, a company union. Early in 1938 the
Amalgamated, an A. F. L. affiliate, filed charges with the NLRB, alleging
unfair practices, upon which a cease and desist order issued in February,
i94o, directing the company to disestablish the Independent. The Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the order in November, i94O, and in December,
i94i, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the NLRB for a redeter-
mination of the issues. In the meantime, early in December, 1941, the
Amalgamated had petitioned the NLRB for representation, claiming the
affiliation of a majority of employees, but in line with NLRB practice, the
petition was withdrawn after the adverse Supreme Court opinion. The
Independent, on the other hand, had negotiated an extension of the con-
tract, including a wage increase. When the Amalgamated voted to strike
unless immediate recognition were forthcoming, the NWLB undertook,
three days before the date set for the strike, to settle the case.
From the standpoint of the NLRB, time was secondary to the pro-
cedures safeguarding the employer from arbitrary administrative action,
since whenever the NLRB moved too slowly for the employees, they were
privileged to strike or use other permissive economic or persuasive methods
to force the employer to yield to their demands.15 Therefore, in times of
io. Id. at 351.
xi. Id. at 354.
12. Frank Foundries Corp., No. 95, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 223, 229 (1942).
13. Set pp. 203-204, infra.
14. No. 41. I WAR LAB. REP. 74 (1942).
x. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike." National Labor Relations Act, § 13, 49 STAT.
457 (x935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 163 (1942).
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peace, a delay of two years would occur only if the union was too weak
to employ economic coercion, while society could bear any diminution of
industrial output resulting from latent employee dissatisfaction. The
NWLB, however, was determined to remove difficulties inimcdiately upon
appearance,"" to prevent any interruption of war production. Moreover,
the union, having forsworn the use of the strike for. the duration, was
compelled to abide the procedure of the Act, howsoever irksome and
unsatisfactory that might be, unless the NWLB undertook to settle the
matter expeditiously. This increasing discontent among the members of
normally powerful labor groups was in itself a menace to continuous pro-
ductivity. Consequently, the position of the Amalgamated that the long
litigation had exhausted the patience of its members, who demanded
immediate recognition, could have justified a final adjudication by the
NWLB exercising the emergency powers delegated by the Executive
Order. Yet, the Board rejected the union argument, and followed almost
exactly the pattern set by the earlier National Defense Mediation Board."
At first, the panel r~sorted to mediation, hoping to decide the question
by mutual agreement rather than resort to the NLRB. When the attempt
failed, the issue was committed to the NLRB with a request to expedite
the case.18 Despite the probability that a considerable period of time
would elapse before a final determination of the controversy, the NWLB
was content to request all parties to continue operations pending settle-
ment of the dispute. Within eight months, under slightly changed circum-
stances, the dispute was back on the dockets of the Board,' 9 but, by that
time, a formula had been developed which effectively solved the con-
troversy.
Labor, still unappeased by this supine conc-sim-f, demanded a more
positive attitude. New employees were joining war industries; wages
were rising without union pressure. To attract the novice the unions
needed at least official standing with the employer-bargaining recognition.
Furthermore as the NWLB widened the maintenance of membership doc-
trine to meet constant defections from union ranks,20 that guarantee in-
variably extended only to those associations recognized as representing
the employees.21 Union recognition meant powers and privileges. Above
all, though organized labor was handicapped by the no-strike pledge, an
unco-operative employer, by insisting upon the procedure of the Wagner
Act, could delay recognition for at least one year, since no sanctions were
available against him until the Circuit Court of Appeals issued an enforce-
x6. "In war production, . . . time is of the essence." J. I. Case Co., Reg. Bd.
VII, No. III-748-D, 9 WAR LAB. REP. 59-63 (June 4, 1943).
17. See note x supra.
8. Requesting the NLRB to expedite a case was a practice which the Executive
Order establishing the National Defense Mediation Board expressly provided. See
note I supra.
ig. Va. Electric and Power Co, No. 4, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 272 (1942). The NWLB
directed the utility to comply with a NLRB order for the disestablishment of the Inde-
pendent.
20. Union security granted because of rapid labor turnover: B. F. Goodrich Co.,
Nos. 184, 190, 3 WAR LAB. RFP. 231 (942), especially at 236; Niles-Bement-Pond
Co., No. 34o, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 489 (Jan. 2, 1943). Danger of raiding by rival union:
Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 56o, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 2o8 (1942) ; Tennessee Coal, Iron
and R. R., No. 465, 4 WAR LAB. RE-P. IO3 (x942).
21. Union security was never granted in vacuo, but was merely defined in a clause
contained in a contract. A union which could obtain no bargaining recognition could
not, of course, negotiate a contract, though it might obtain grievance recognition.
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ment order, directing compliance on pain of contempt; 22 meanwhile, the
union might decline in numbers and prestige. Labor would not submit to
an Act, which, instead of extending a supplemental privilege, as originally
passed, was becoming the sole remedy. Either some rapid method of
settlement within the existing framework had to be found, or the NWLB
might be forced to appropriate complete jurisdiction.
In the Ohio Public Service case, 23 the NWLB evolved a practical
means of adjusting the Wagner Act to the war situation. Hoping even-
tually to obtain a review by the courts, the company refused to bargain
with the union winning the NLRB election. The NWLB thereupon
directed "that the company shall immediately recognize and bargain with
the union." "Certifications by authorized representatives of the NLRB
are final and binding upon this Board until and unless modified or reversed
by the NLRB or appropriate judicial authority." 2 ' Though questions of
employee representation were left to the NLRB, the NWLB undertook to
enforce the certifications therein given, by ordering the employer to bargain
with the recognized'union .2  As certification was a comparatively rapid
process, the NLRB continued functioning, and disputes could still be
settled expeditiously to the satisfaction of the unions.
Unfortunately, capital soon confronted the Board with a dilemma.
The cumbersome NLRB procedure is attributable to the requirements of
due process, the right to a judicial review of an administrative proceeding.
A NWLB directive ordering immediate compliance with a NLRB order
denied this right to the employer. 6  To meet this objection, the NWLB
22. To obtain recognition, a union would file a petition for investigation and cer-
tification, upon which the NLRB would hold a hearing after due notice, and usually
take a ballot of employees. Should the union be certified, no means of compulsion to
bargain collectively are available. Upon refusal to negotiate, a complaint would issue
against the employer, another hearing held, when a cease and desist order would issue
directing the termination of the unfair labor practice. This order, too, could not be
directly enforced, but the Circuit Court of Appeals, either upon petition by the NLRB,
or on appeal by the employer, could direct an enforcement, on pain of contempt of
court.
23. No. i69. 2 WAR LAB. RF,. 144 (1942). Memorandum decision. Earlier, in
Sperry Gyroscope Co., No. 7o, I WAR LAB. REP. 167 (1942), the NWLB took the
position that a NLRB order is in full force and effect. However, the instant case is
the first ordering positive compliance. See also Central Foundry Co., Ne. 195, 1 WAR
LAB. REP. 255 (1942).
24. Central Foundry Co., No. 195, 1 WAR LAB. REP. 255, 258 (1942).
25. Company ordered to disestablish company union: Va. Electric and Power Co.,
No. 41, 4 WAR LAn. REP. 272 (942) ; Western Cartridge Co., No. 491, 4 WAR LAB.
REP. 427 (1942) ; Baltimore Transit Co., No. 522, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 122 (Apr. 27
1943). Company ordered to bargain with certified union: American Rolbal Corp., No.
14 -16-D, 7 \VAR I.AB. REP. qoo (Apr. 24, 1943) ; American Linen Service Co., No.,
4281-D, 8 WAR LAn. REP. 126 (Apr. 24, 2943) ; National Laundry Co., No. 429 1-D,
8 W\AR LAB. REP. 127 (Apr. 24, 1943) ; Moench Tanning Co., No. 277, 8 WAR LAB.
REP. 54 (Mar. 26, 1943) (NLRB certification upheld by Circuit Court of Appeals).
See also Toledo, P. and W. R. R., No. 48, 1 WAR LAB. RFrP. 46 (1942) (railroad
ordered to arbitrate dispute in accordance with Railway Labor Act).
If no decision was issued by the NLRB, the NWLB of course was powerless to
act. Va. Electric and Power Co., No. 4 t , I WAR. LAB. RaP. 74 (1942), discussed in
tex-t.
See Frankel Bros., No. II-D-8, Reg. Bd. X, 8 WAR LAB. REP. No. 2, IX (Apr.,
1943). Directive that contract incorporate clause, "The firm recognizes the union as
the sole bargaining agency for all employees of the employer. .. 
26. In the Lebanon Steel Co. case, No. 333, 2 WAR LAB. REP. 283 (1942) (NLRB
order directing the company to cease and desikt from bargaining collectively sustained
by the Circuit Court of Appeals) the N\VLB brushed aside the contention that the
right to a Supreme Court review was denied by a directive ordering compliance with
a NI.RB order, on the ground that the right of review rested in the Supreme Court
and not in the partie . The di-tinction between an appeal as of right and as of grace
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later provided that if the trial examiner's findings should not be sustained
by the NLRB, or if the NLRB order be reversed by the courts, any agree-
ment signed by the parties pursuant to a directive shall terminate.21
Even this modification, however, seems a questionable remedy in some
instances. In the J. I. Case Co.2s case, for instance, the denial of judicial
review seemed patent. The Company, contesting the validity of a NLRB
election, refused to bargain with the union. Without filing charges with
the NLRB, the union managed to bring the dispute before the NWLB.
Since the Wagner Act does not provide for an appeal from an election
decision, 29 the employer contended that, in order to contest the validity of
the certification, he must permit a cease and desist order to issue. A
directive ordering bargaining with the union certified by the NLRB would
preclude a court review of his claim. The panel admitted that the union's
actions will "take from the company its day in court," but they believed
"that the technical point raised by the company cannot be allowed to
delay . . . negotiation of a labor contract. . . . It is the hope of the
panel, however, that ways may be found to save for the company an oppor-
tunity to try its case through the regular judicial channels." 30 No concrete
suggestion how that could be done was forthcoming.21
Grappling with the same objections in the Shcll Oil Co."2 case, the
Board formulated an answer, which, though more convincing, was never-
theless weak. Again an employer, challenging the propriety of a NLRB
certification of a bargaining unit, refused to negotiate with the union in
order to conserve a power of appeal. Again the NWLB enforced the
NLRB order. The decision argued that the National Labor Relations
seems questionable. Nowadays, the most common form of Supreme Court review is
by writ of certiorari. 43 STAT. 936 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. §347 (1928). (Doalm,
FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 838, 839). Yet is does not follow that an executive or
administrative body may nullify this privilege by its action. Basing the decision on the
emergency powers of the Board seems more tenable. Possibly the first argument -con-
troverted the provision in the Executive Order that existing remedies must be ex-
hausted before the NWLB may take jurisdiction. Or the Board may have referred
to the provision in the National Labor Relations Act that review by the Supreme
Court is had "upon writ of certiorari of certification as provided in sections 346 and 347
of Title 28." 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6oa (ig42).
27. Western Cartridge Co., No. 491, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 427 (1942); American
Rolbal Corp., No. iii-16, 7 WAR LAB. REP. 5oo (Apr. 14, 1943); American Linen
Service Co., No. 4291-D, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 126 (Apr. 24, 1943); National Laundry
Co., No. 4291-D, 8 WVAR LAB. REP. 127 (Apr. 24, 1943); Baltimore Transit Co No.
522, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 122 (Apr. 27, 1943). Cf. Va. Electric and Power Co., No. 4,
4 WAR LAB. REP. 272 (1942).
28. Reg. Bd. VII, No. 11-7 4 8-D, 9 WAR LAB. REP. 59 (June 4, 1943).
29. American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, 3o8 U. S.
40!, 6o Sup. Ct. 300, 84 L Ed. 347 (1940) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 3o8 U. S. 4x3, 6o Sup. Ct. 36,'84 L Ed.
354 (1940).
3o. The Board itself, while upholding the recommendations of the panel, stressed
the validity of the eertification, and the lack of a bona fide company claim.
31. § 2 of the Executive Order directing that other established procedures be ex-
haused before the NWLB assumes jurisdiction of a dispute has been continuously
used by employers attacking NWLB intervention according to the Ohio Public
Service rule. The NWLB gave scant attention to the argument in the Ohio Public
Service case, and the Lebanon Steel Co. case, note 26 supra. See discussion in Pacific
Gas and Electric Co., No. 310, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 68 (1942).
32. No. 92, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 296 (1942), especially at 301, 302. It is sur-
prising that the Regional Board in the J. I. Case Co. case, note 28 supra, did not
refer to the argument used herein. See also Pacific Gas and Electric Co., No. 310, 4
WAR LAB. REP. 68 (i942).
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Act gave the union an option to file charges against the employer with the
NLIRB or to strike; that unless charges of unfair labor practices were filed
and prosecuted, the employer's right to an appeal never accrued. In fact,
judicial review was not an absolute right, but dependent upon prior union
action. By applying to the NWLB, the union, instead of relying upon the
NLRB alternative, invoked the wartime substitute for a strike, a substitute
which could not sustain the procedural prerequisites to judicial interven-
tion.3 Unfortunately, the NXVLB is more than a mere alternative to a
strike. Strikes may be lost, but NWLB action will ultimately culminate
in military seizure; an employer may meet the economic threats of labor
with all legally permissible means, but he has no privilege to defy the
NWLB. Surely the coercive capacity of the NLRB, rather than the
economically persuasive powers of the strike may be attributed to the
NWLB. If labor be given access to the NWLB, then capital ought to
obtain the right to a review, which a similar resort to the NLRB entails.
The practical result of the NWLB contention in the Shell Oil Co. case is
an abatement of NLRB jurisdiction. Unions may have used the strike in
lieu of further NLRB proceedings sonetimes, but they will alays substi-
tute the certain, inexpensive process of the NWLB to force an employer
to acknowledge a bargaining certification. At least one function of the
NLRB-the enforcement of its certifications by cease and desist orders and
contempt proceedings-thus falls in abeyance. 4
Apparently, the Ohio Public Service rule does, in some instances,
deprive employers of some safeguards written into the Wagner Act."
Those who treasure the title of the law might justly argue that the National
Laibor Relations Act was being partially disregarded. Nevertheless, the
NWLB faced the alternative of modifying the enforcement mechanism of
the Wagner Act to assure unremittent production of war materials, thereby
depriving the employer in some instances of his right to judicial review,
or undertaking to decide itself all disputes, thus depriving the employer in
all cases of any practical access to the courts. The NWLB has safeguarded
the powers of the NLRB, though pragmatic necessities may have forced
some curtailment of all the privileges of the employer. But the right of
property has suffered more severe curtailment at the hands of other war
agencies.
The NWLB has consistently refused to look beyond the face of a
NLRB certification. When asked to set aside a contract signed pursuant
to an election, which, it was claimed, was invalid, the Board refused "to
33. Shell Oil Co., No. 92, 3 WAR LAB. REm. 296, 302 (942). See employer dis-
sent at 308-310.
34. In a few instances, unions, facing the prospect of delayed recognition, called a
work stoppage in order to come within the cognizance of the NWLB and its more
effective remedies. See the testimony of the union president in the Parker Wolverine
Co. case, No. XI-470-D, 7 W~a LAB. REP. 572 (Mar. 8, i943). This was quite evi-
dent in the J. 1. Case Co. case, No. x1-748-D, Reg. Bd. VII, 9 WAR LAB. REP. 59
(June 4. 1943), as the union did not file charges with the NLRB against an employer
who refused to bargain collectively after it had won a representation election, but suc-
ceeded in bringing the controversy to the NWLB. The dissent states the apparent facts.
"This union seeks to by-pass the NLRB and present its case directly to the NWLB
without exhausting all opportunities afforded under N. L. R. A. . . . It could not
help but reflect discredit on NLRB and result in a lack of confidence in that body."
At 66.
35. See also Acme Evans Milling Co., No. 584, 6 WAR-LAB. REP. 163 (Jan. x8,
1043), where the mediation officer advised that no directive to force the company to
follow the NLRB order be issued, as the employer's right to an appeal to the Supreme
Court would be cut off. The report was overruled.
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usurp the function of another governmental agency." s3 To undertake a
re-examination of NLRB orders would have led all dissatisfied parties to
press for a redetermination of their claim by the NWLB. In like manner,
the Board has refused to settle disputes involving a delimitation of the
bargaining unit.37 Thus, the request of a union which had won an election
at the plant to extend the contract to two nearby plants, which, it alleged,
were but expansions made by the Company to evade the results of the
election, was denied, until the remedies available with the NLRB be
exhausted.3 8 In fact, when a certified independent union became affiliated
with the C. I. 0., the NWLB overruled its mediator's report based on the
opinion of the regional NLRB director that the C. I. 0. acquired the
Independent's bargaining rights, and rather than revise the original NLRB
certification, it directed the union to petition the NLRB for a new certifi-
cation.39 As the definition of bargaining units may involve difficult ques-
tions of fact, the usage of the Board has the practical utility of referring
such questions to an experienced agency. Only rarely has the NWLB
issued a directive involving bargaining units, directing the Bethlehein
Steel Company to include within the contract any new shipbuilding facilities
which might be opened at a nearby island.40
DiSCIIARGE
On the whole, the pattern outlined in the discussion on collective
bargaining was continued in disputes involving discharge for union activity.
In one substantial respect, however, the NWLB based concurrent original
jurisdiction in discharge cases on a statutory limitation of NILRB authority.
36. Central Foundry, No. 195, \WAR LAB. REP. 255, 258 (942). See Parker
Wolverine Co., No. XI-4 7o-D, 7 WAR LAB. REP. 572 (Mar. 8, 1943).
37. Wilson Jones Co., No. 161, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 312 (1942); Fulton County
Tanners, No. 221o-D (83), 9 WAR LAB. REP. No. 6, VIII (July 9, 1943); New Bed-
ford Rayon Co., No. 1I1-171o-D, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 687 (May 31, 3943) (union chal-
lenged NLRB determination of bargaining unit) ; Bell Aircraft Corp., No. ii1-3-C,
10 WAR LAB. REP. 126 (July 30, 1943) (parties should negotiate issues, and if unable
to agree, refer question to NLRB). See also Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., No. iii-
35I -C, 13 LAB. REL. REP. 196 (Oct. 12, 1943), for effect of vote taken under pro-
visions of the War Labor Defense Act. Even the ingenious union agreement in Fed-
eral Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., No. 25-3go-D, ii WAR LAB. REP. 226 (Sept. 15,
1943) was unacceptable.
38. Remington Rand Co., No. 424, 7 WAR LAB. REP. 183 (Mar. 26, 1943). See
also Corcoran Metal Products Co., No. 468, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 323 (1942) ; U. S. Car-
tridge Co., No. 75, 2 VAR LAn. REP. 96 (3942) (parties shall negotiate contract, to
terminate if the NLRB determines that a different unit or agency %:ould be appropri-
ate); Woodward Iron Co., No. iii-12o5-D, Reg. Bd. IV, 10 WAR LAB. REP. 473
(Aug. 4, 1943). In the Great American Industries case, No. 311-467-R, Reg. Bd. IV,
ii WAR LAB. REP. 287 (Aug. 27, 1943) the Regional Board, in permitting the guards
to join the same union as the production workers, follows NLRB decisions on the
question. The Borg-Varner Corp. case, No. 4246-A, 1o WAR LAB. REP. 631 (Aug. 18,
1943) was also decided on the basis of NLRB precedents.
39. Easy Washing Machine Co., No. 703, 6 VAR LAB. REP. 3o (Jan. 9, 1943).
40. Bethlehem Steel Co., No. 117, 6 VAR LAB. REP. 513 (Feb. 10, 1943) ; Atlan-
tic Basin Iron Works, No. 25-29-D-io, Shipbuilding Comm., 9 WAR LAB. REP. 186
(June 3. 1943) ; cf. Brewster Aeronautical Co., No. 111-3372-D, x WAR LAB!. REP.
286 (Sept. 24, 1943). Another clause in the directive provided that any issue as to
whether any employee is within a specific bargaining unit should be handled by the
usual grievance procedure. Later the NWLB apparently felt that this provision was
beyond their jurisdiction. See Woolworth Co., No. AR-365, 9 WAR LAB. REP. 161
(Mfay 27, 1943). But cf. Bell Aircraft Corp., No. III-I31-C, 10 WAR LAB. REP. 326
(July 30, 1943).
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While the National Labor Relations Act extends to all questions of rep-
resentation, the NLRB can order the reinstatement of an employee only
if his discharge arose because of some activity protected by the Act. Merely
unjustified discharges, if they are not based on anti-union bias, are outside
the jurisdiction of the NLRB. On the other hand, unfair and unjust dis-
charges may lead to industrial unrest, and thus fall within the purview
of the NWLB." Since the assigned reasons for discharge will seldom
disclose anti-union discrimination, the question of the fairness of the em-
ployer's action will necessarily arise first, to be adjudicated by the NWLB.
In the Frank Foundries case,' 2 for instance, the union asked for the rein-
statement of ten men discharged without "proper cause." Earlier charges
filed with the NLRB were withdrawn when the case was certified to the
Board. The company cited Section 2, and possible NLRB jurisdiction as
a bar to NWLB action. Dismissing the argument, the Board reasoned
that the union's charges center upon the propriety of the discharge, a
question beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRB; that, in addition, the em-
ployees are not limited solely to NLRB remedies, but they may seek relief
from other tribunals, be they courts or a NWLB. Apparently, as long as
the union alleges merely the unfairness of a discharge, the NWLB will
assume jurisdiction.
Actually, the NWLB did not issue a specific directive in this case, but,
after asserting jurisdiction, it permitted the union to file charges with the
NLRB or to arbitrate the dispute as provided by contract. Since "this
issue iivolves . . . not merely the question of what adjustment is needed
for plant discipline . . . but also questions as to the circumstances sur-
rounding the discharge . . . best suited for determination by judicial
proceedings of the type that arbitration or the National Labor Relations
Board procedures provide," 43 administrative convenience, the ease with
which the other agencies can get at the facts, dictated the result. Inter-
party settlements, either through grievance machinery, or by an arbitrator
mutually chosen, have been favored," until in one instance an order was
issued referring the disputes to grievance machinery, though earlier charges
had been filed with the NLRB."
Although the NWLB has accepted original jurisdiction of discharge
disputes, it has refused to make an independent adjudication of a case
pending before the NLRB at any stage of that Board's procedure. 6 More-
over, the reinstatement of a discharged worker will be directed in com-
41. Hurd Lock Co., No. 40i9-R, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 224 (Apr. 27, 1943); Lunken-
heimer Co., No. AR-46, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 3o (Jan. 6, 1943).
42. No. 95, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 223 (I942).
43. Thermoid Co., No. 155, 2 WAR LAB. REP. 133, 134 (1942).
44. Frank Foundries Co., No. 95, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 223 (1942); Thermoid Co,
No. 155, 2 WAR LAB. REP. 133 (1942). But see American Rolbal Corp, No. 1i1-16,
7 WAR. LAB. REP. 500 (Apr. 14, 1943) (parties shall not be required to arbitrate any
question involving unfair labor practices) ; cf. North American Aviation Co., No. 2435,
1o WAR LAB. REP. 314. (July 29, 1943).
45. Winchester Arms, No. 443, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 359 (Feb. 5, 1943). And see
almost identical result in Ohio Steel Foundry, No. 403, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 24 (Jan. ii,
1943).
46. Western Cartridge Co., No. 49t, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 427 (1942). In the Park
Drop Forge case, No. hh1-1o13-D, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 269 (Apr. 24, 1943), the NWLB
refused to order the transfer of a C. 1. 0. member, whose partisanship was disturbing
his A. F. L. co-workers, to a C. 1. 0. unit within the same plant, because company may
be directed to commit an unfair labor practice.
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pliance with a NLRB order, 47 or pending a decision by the trial examiner,4
although no back pay will be given.49 Such reinstatement is usually stated
to be without prejudice to the company's right to resort to the courts, and
terminates automatically upon an adverse decision therein.50
Despite the apparent soundness of the argument in the Frank Foun-
dries case, the NWLB has since reversed its position. "In all cases of
complaints about discharges, the NWLB ought not to act unless the num-
ber of men discharged was so large a group that their remaining out would
interfere with the war effort.5' . . .- It is true that in some discharge
cases the union does not claim that the discharge was on account of union
activity, but simply that the discharge was arbitrary . . . The NLRB
feels, however, that . . . if we decide that the employer would or did
not have just cause for the discharge we are deciding the main issue which
the NLRB would have to decide if the cases were brought to the NLRB.5
* . * The NLRB stated that courts now hold that if the employer cannot
show any just cause for discharging a man, the inference is almost ines-
capable that he discharge him for union activity. . . . The NLRB also
feels . . . that if we continue to act on discharges . . . there will be
an increasing tendency on the part of unions to bring discharge cases to us
without mentioning that the real ground of complaint is anti-union activity.
Consequently . . . the only safe thing to do in discharge cases is not to
take them at all save under . . . exceptional circumstances." 53 The
47. Western Cartridge Co., No. 491, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 427 (1942); Winchester
Arms Co., No. 443, 6 WAR LA. REP. 359 (Feb. 5, 1943); Borg-Warner Corp., No.
517, 7 WAR LAB. REP. zig (Mar. 15, 1943) ; Baltimore Transit Co., No. 522, 8 WAR
LAB. REP. 122 (Apr. 27, 1943). Compare the Sperry Gyroscope case, No. 70, I WAR
LAB. REP. 167 (1942), the first case in which a discharge question came before the
NWLB, and the Acme Evans Milling Corp. case, No. 584, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 163
(Jan. 18, 1943). In the Acme Evans Milling case, a NLRB order to reinstate dis-
charged workers was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but the company
planned to appeal to the Supreme Court. The company was ordered to comply with
the NLRB decision. In the Sperry Gyroscope case, the NLRB had petitioned the
Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement of a reinstatement order. The NWLB re-
fused to issue a directive covering the points. See note 29 supra. In the Baltimore
Transit Co. case, No. 522, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 5OO (May 25, 1943) the NWLB sus-
pended its directive calling for compliance with the orders of the NLRB as soon as
the NLRB applied to the Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement.
48. Western Cartridge Co., No. 491, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 427 (1942).
49. Winchester Arms Co., No. 443, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 359 (Feb. 5, 1943) ; Acme
Evans Milling Co., No. 584, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 163 (Jan. i8, 1943) ; Western Cartridge
Co., No. 491, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 427 (1942).
5o. Ibid.
5i. In the Trailer Co. of America case, No. VD-i86, Reg. Bd. V, 9 WAR LAB.
REP. 8o9 (June 25, 1943), a closed-shop clause was suspended under which 12 men
were discharged on the eve of a NLRB election, and a truce ordered.
52. But in Hurd Lock Co., No. 40i9-R, 8 VAR LAB. REP. 224 (Apr. 27, 1943),
Lunkenheimer Co., No. AR-46, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 30 (Jan. 6, 1943), and in Centrifugal
Fusing Co., note 5z infra, admittedly there was no question of anti-union discrimina-
tion. The argument would apply to the borderline case of Yellow Truck and Coach
ffg. Co., No. i1-9x-D, Reg. Bd. XI, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 456 (May x3, 1943).
53. Centrifugal Fusing Co., i3 LAB. REL. REP. 187 (1943). In Carter Carbu-
retor Corp., No. 148, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 565 (Feb. z7, 1943), the company discharged
some union men. The union filed charges with the NLRB, and, in the meantime, the
NWLB, having assumed jurisdiction, mediated an agreement whereby the company
agreed to relieve the employees in consideration for the withdrawal of the charges.
The NLRB refused to permit the withdrawal (under Art. II, § i of the Rules and
Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, series 2, as amended to April 18,
1941) and the trial examiner ordered the reinstatement of the employees. Thereupon
the NWLB directive ordered the immediate reinstatement of the workers without back
pay, pending a NLRB decision and any appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals. This
proved the only case of immediate conflict between the Boards, and it occurred in a
dispute over a discharge. Of course, the employees under the NLRB award received
back pay after the reinstatement, while the NWLB directed rehiring only.
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attempt to extend the uncontes tcd jurisdiction of the NWLB over dis-
charges involving only the question of unfairness, to include the entire class
of discharge cases, even those involving unfair labor practices, was frus-
trated on the strength of a contrary theoretical premise, as well as through
the realization that organized labor would naturally seek the more efficient
remedies of the NWLB.
GRIEVANCE RECOGNITION
The rules of the NLRB provide for the withholding of a certification
election in the plant of an employer who refused to obey a cease and desist
order to disestablish a company dominated union,-until compliance is forth-
coming. Normally, the employees might seek to achieve immediate recog-
nition by striking; ", of course, with a national no-strike agreement, the
union is temporarily remediless. Seeking to avert strikes, but finding that
this procedural rule blocked the path to possibly legitimate recognition,
the National Defense Mediation Board developed the technique of partial
recognition, assuring to the members of a union the right to have their
grievance settled through their delegates.5 5 Even under the Ohio Public
Serziice rule, the need for such temporary recognition arose in some cases,
and the NWLB has consistently adhered to the Sperry Gyroscqpe case,5
wherein grievance representation was granted. The NWLB stressed that
the NLRB was unable to give any relief in this form; that friction was
being neutralized by this transitory remedy.5r This limited recognition
was only to last pending full certification, or an unfavorable court judg-
ment.' s Presumably, the presence of such a grievance procedure could not
affect the NLRB activity; it merely filled a hole dug by the rio-strike pledge.
54. For a recent use of the strike where union petition for certification was.denied,
see New Bedford Rayon Co., No. I-171o-D, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 687 (May 31, 1943).
55. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., M. B. No. 22; Gulf States Utilities
Corp., M. B. No. 53; Federal Mogul Corp., M. B. No. 52. Bulletin No. 7t4, note I
supra.
56. No. 70, I WAR LAB. REP. 167 (1942). In Baltimore Transit Co., No. 522, 4
WAR LAB. RzEP. 363 (1942) grievance recognition was given to an unrecognized union
following a report by a NLRB trial examiner recommending the disestablishment of
its rival. In Acme Evans Milling Co., No. s84, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 163 (Jan. i8, 1943)
and Thompson Products, No. S16, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 384 (1942), a petition for elec-
tion was pending. See Pacific Mills Worsted Division, I1-7o5-D, Reg. Bd. I, 1i
WAR LAB. REP. 239 (Aug. 11, 1943), where majority spoke of "the reluctance of the
NWLB to prescribe grievance procedures where no majority union has been certified."
Grievance recognition granted to an unrecognized and uncertified union because it is
the only one in the plant: Tenn. Schuylkill Corp., No. 585, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 29o (Jan.
25, 1943). Contra: Harry Davies Moulding Co., No. 4305-D, 1i WAR LAB. REP. 188
(Aug. 26, 1943) overruling recommendation of Mediation Officer. Apparently, the
Board is restricting recognition, see T3 LAB. R.z_ REP. 137 (1943). In the Hughes
Tool Co. case, VIII-D-78, Reg. Bd. VIII, 11 WAR LAB. REP. 477 (Sept. 8, i943), the
NWLB stopped grievance recognition to a minority union after the NLRB had certi-
fied its rival, as opposed to § 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act. 49 STAT. 453
(1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i5ga (1942).
57. Baltimore Transit Co., No. 522, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 363 (Nov. i8, 1942).
58. Va. Electric and Power Co., No. 41, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 272 ('942): Acme
Evans Milling Co., No. 584, 6 WAR LAB. REP. 163 (Jan. z8, 1943) ; Tenn. Schuylkill
Corp., No. 585, 6 WAR LAB. REP. --go (Jan. 25, 1943). When the Circuit Court of
Appeals set aside a NLRB disestablishment order, the grievance machinery ended, Sun
Shipbuilding Co., No. 427, 3 WAR LAB. REP. 404 (942) and 7 WAR LAB. REP. 472
(Apr. 8, 1943). Usually the grievance procedure was outlined in some detail, apparently
in the hope that when the parties enter into full bargaining agreements, they would
incorporate similar procedures in their contract. The Board has made it clear that
limited recognition does not obligate the employer to bargain collectively. In Balti-
NOTES
WAGE APPLICATIONS AND UNION MAINTENANCE
At times, before rendering directives on union security or wage peti-
tions, the effect of the adjudication on imminent NLRB action had to be
considered. For instance, an employer's petition for approval of a wage
increase on the eve of a certification election was denied, because the
NLRB had adjudged an increase under similar circumstances an unfair
labor practice. 9 Later, the NWLB reversed its practice, asserting that
by approving an application for higher wage rates, it is merely resolving
whether the request is consistent with the wage stabilization policy, without
determining whether an unfair labor practice has been committed or not.
Apparently, two conflicting, considerations are involved: How pregnant
is the possibility that granting the application would actually interfere with
the enforcement of the Wagner Act? How much dissatisfaction would a
delay arouse among the employees, and to what extent would that ill
feeling retard the war effort? 0o In those cases where an election is pend-
ing, should the increase prove an unfair labor practice, the election might
be postponed until the effects of the increase be dissipated. The net result
would be increasing labor discontent. Consequently, upon facts which
seriously warrant the probability of a breach of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, the dissatisfaction which a processing delay would awaken might
be small, especially if any warranted subsequent increase be made retro-
active.8 1 On the other hand, in processing the usual wage increase appli-
cation, the NWLB should scrutinize the contract to see only whether the
terms are in accord with the wage stabilization policy. Otherwise, it may
become involved in a mass of problematical speculations, which will not
* aid administrative efficiency. After all, these are not cases where the
NWLB has issued a directive granting a wage increase, when the effect
of such an order on the NLRB should be weighed.61
Union security, too, has become enmeshed with the National Labor
Relations Act. Maintenance of membership has been granted to a union,
in part, because the employer had consistently defied the NLRB,' or
because he had raised wages under conditions which almost violated NLRB
rules on the subject.' A request of an A. F. L. union for renewal of a
more Transit Co., No. 522, 4 WAR LAB. REP. 363, 364 (1942), the directive read:
"This recognition shall apply only to grievances, and does not obligate the company
to enter into a full collective contract." Similar language was used in the Sperry
Gyroscope case, No. 70, 1 WAR LAB. REP. 167 (942). In only one case has the
NWLB ordered more than a limited form of recognition. In U. S. Cartridge Co.,
No. 75, 2 WAR LAB. REP. 96 (1942), the parties were ordered to negotiate a contract
covering hours, wages, etc. The contract shall terminate if NLRB determines a dif-
ferent agency to be appropriate. See also Lamson and Sessions Co., No. 41o, 8 WAR
LAB. REP. 295 (May 10, 1943) and the Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., No. 99,
I WAR LAB. REP. 215 (1942).
59. Western Cartridge Co, No. 49T, 6 WAR LAB. RE'. 17 (Jan. 8, 1943).
6o. Where a NLRB decision on union petition will be delayed for many months,
the NWLB will order the company to renew a contract with the union which had won
an election previously. Lamson and Sessions Co., No. 41o, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 295
(May io, 1943). But if a NLRB order is imminent, then NWLB will postpone col-
lective bargaining until the NLRB renders its decision. Nevada Consolidated Copper
Corp., No. 99, 1 WAR LAB. RE'. 215 (1942).
61. Diamond Match Co., No. 842, Reg. Bd. X, 10 WAR LAB. Rn'. 730 (July 28,
(1943) (wage increase made retroactive to date when union proposed negotiations).
62. See Condenser Corp. of America, Nos. BWA-366 and 96, 7 WAR LAB. RE. 359
(Mar. 23, 1943).
63. Remington Rand, No. 424, 7 WAR LAB. REP. x83 (Mar. 26, 1943).
64. Five St. Louis Refractories Cos., No. 348, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 133 (1942).
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union security clause in its contract was denied, pending action of the
NLRJB on a petition.for certification filed by a growing rival C. I. 0.
organization. 5
CONCLUSION 66
The NLRB is a peacetime agency endowed with the limited function
of guiding the development of collective bargaining by attending to a
minutely described procedure. Because the NLRB cannot enlarge its
jurisdiction or change its procedure to meet wartime demands, the NWLB
was given authority over the gamut of labor disputes affecting war pro-
duction, with power to decide promptly and expeditiously, backed by
immediately effective sanctions." Insofar as the NLRB has successfully
65. Polatch's Forests, Inc., 12 LAB. REL. REP. 629 (1943). Union security was
denied to a "phantom" union certified by the NLRB until A. F. L. should incorporate
the union, Dresser Mfg. Co., No. iii-614-D, Reg. Bd. III, 9 WAR LAB. REP. 67 (June
3, 1943).
66. No attempt has been made to discuss in the body of the note intrastate cases
involving representation questions or alleged discriminatory discharges inasmuch as
they do not affect directly NWLB and NLRB relations. As the National Labor Rela-
tions Act applies only to disputes affecting interstate commerce, if the employer en-
gages solely in intrastate trade, in the absence of a state labor relations act which
would govern, the NWLB, despite vigorous minority dissent, has undertaken to settle
these controversies in order to prevent strikes in wartime. It is interesting to note
that whenever an election was held under NWLB auspices, the procedure of the NLRB
has been copied. The Austin Co., No. 4264-D, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 189 (Apr. io, 1943);
New Service Laundries Co., No. III-1536-D, Reg. Bd. XII, 10 WAR LAB. REP. 626
(Aug. 5, 1943). Thus, where the determination of a bargaining unit was involved, the
decision of the NLRB in a similar case was cited as precedent. Southern Service Co,
Ltd., No. 14-358-C, Reg. Bd. X, 8 WAR LAB. REP. 442 (Apr. 24, 1943). Evidently,
the modus viendi between the two bodies rests on firmer grounds than a clause in
the Executive Order. The NLRB is influential because it controls techniques and
principles which any other agency invading the same field could hot but imitate.
Recently, the NWLB seems to restrict the exercise of its jurisdiction in cases
affecting intrastate commerce. See 13 LAB. REL. REP. 137, 229 (1943).
67. Until the passage of the War Labor Disputes Act, Pub. L. No. 89, 78th Cong.,
tst Sess. (June 25, 1943) C. 144, the only sanctions behind a NWLB directive were
the support of overwhelming public opinion and the threat that the President, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, would seize the plant of a recalcitrant employer. The legality of the
latter means has never been judicially ascertained, though used by Presidents Wilson
and F. D. Roosevelt. See Note (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 427, 5o6-534. Sanction
against the union has usually consisted of a denial of a maintenance of membership
clause in the contract. In the only published judicial opinion discussing the legal pow-
ers of the Board, Baltimore Transit Co. v. Flynn, 5o F. Supp. 382 (D. C. Md. 1943)
(suit to enjoin the United States District Attorney for the District of Maryland and
the District Manager of the Office of Defense Transportation from enforcing a NWLB
directive denied, because the defendants were not the proper parties to the suit) the
court, after deciding the case, expressed its opinion that the Board did not possess the
power to issue binding directives, but pointed to the difficulty of naming the proper
persons to be enjoined.
Other actions were instituted also. A group of motor carriers brought suit in
the District Court for the District of Columbia to set aside an order issued by the
Board's Trucking Commission. Similarly, a petition for a declaratory judgment and
an injunction was brought to restrain the Regional Board at Detroit from issuing an
order in a dispute between a union and owners of an office building. In the latter suit,
the company argued that if the subject of the dispute affected interstate commerce,
then the controversy comes within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, which, by the terms
of the Executive Order, would deprive the NWLB of jurisdiction. See 12 LAB. Rm..
REP. 593 (1943) for a discussion of the cases.
The passage of the War Labor Disputes Act which added statutory authorization
to the Board's power (§ 7) will probably lead to an increase in litigation. See 13 LAB.
NOTES
settled the controversies within its compass, the NWLB has carefully re-
frained from interfering. Thus questions of bargaining units and repre-
sentatives, of unfair labor practices, have been left almost entirely to the
adjudication of the NLRB. Wherever the NLRB was found wanting, the
NWLB assumed authority. The weakness of the NLRB in wartime is
twofold. The rapid relocation of manpower and the sudden expansion of
new industries offered a premium to flexible, rapidly adjusting labor
organizations, but the speed of the NLRB had been established eight years
ago when movement was sloiv. If under normal conditions, the unions
might have supplied the momentum by using the economic weapons per-
mitted by the Wagner Act, the no-strike pledge placed labor in the position
where gains depended entirely upon the discretion of governmental
agencies. The NLRB again, was never gifted with discretion. 8  By
enforcing the decisions of the NLRB at any stage, the Ohio Public Service
rule furnished speed; limited recognition, decisions in discharge cases, use
of wage stabilization powers and maintenance of membership clauses, pro-
vided discretion. In times of war, speed is essential, and discretion the
better part of valor.
M.K.
United States v. Associated Press *
The by-laws of the Associated Press provided that an owner of a
newspaper could become a memberJhy-a-vote of the board of directors, but,
if there was an existing member in the same field (morning, evening or
Sunday) in the applicant's city, it must be voted in by a majority of all
"regular" members. In an action by the United States to enjoin the
enforcement of this by-law as a violation of the Sherman and Clayton
Anti-trust Acts, the court, Swan, J., dissenting, granted the injunction,
with permission to impose conditions on admission to membership pro-
REH_ REP. 229 (943). It has been claimed that the NWLB is immune to court action
because the Board's orders are not self-enforcing but merely advisory, penalization
coming through other agencies or powers. See 12 LAB. Rm.. REP. 941 (1943). How-
ever, the War Labor Disputes Act states that the Board should "decide the dispute,
and provide by order the wages and hours and all other terms and conditions, . . .
which shall be in effect until further order of the Board." § 7 (a) (2). Though no
power of appeal is given from the orders of the Board, the action of the Board may be
attacked on jurisdictional grounds, since the Act defines the extent of the authority of
the NWLB. § 7 (a) (i). Thus, the. Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia, on
August 18, 1943, issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting a panel of the Re-
gional War Labor Board from proceeding in the settlement of a dispute involving
laundries. x2 LAB. RE.. REP. 937 (1943). An Executive Order issued on Aug. 16,
1943, No. 9370, 8 FED. RE. 11463 (Aug. I9, 1943), has expanded the penalties for non-
compliance with NWLB directives. Thus, disobeying employers face not only the
operation of their plants by the Government, but the less drastic, though possibly even
more persuasive, threat of a withholding of essential priorities or the withdrawl of
defense contracts. Individual employees may be punished by the cancellation of draft
deferments or employment privileges, while unions will not receive, after seizure of
the plant, checked-off dues nor the benefits of the collective agreement until fQll com-
pliance.
68. See Note, Handling Wartime Strikes: National Labor Relations Board and
War Labor Board Compared (1933) 11 GFo. WASH. L. REV. 366.
* New York Times, October 7, z943, pages 16, 17.
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vided members in the same "field" as applicant do not have the power to
impose or dispense with the conditions and provided further that the by-
laws affirmatively declare that the effect of admission upon the ability of an
applicant to compete with members in the same "field" shall not be taken
into consideration in passing upon his application.
AP is a co-operative news gathering organization in competition with
other organizations such as United Press and International News Service.
There is no suggestion that AP has achieved its present prominent posi-
tion by predatory or other improper competitive practices. The issue is
simply whether or not the services of AP, developed by the efforts and
capital of its own members, must be made available to those newspapers
which are competitors, upon the same terms as other non-members are
admitted to the association. The Court answers this question in the
affirmative and in doing so it is extending the operation of the anti-trust
laws into a new field.
The dissenting judge points out that the by-laws attacked have no
tendency to create a monopoly in news gathering and there is no proof that
they have stifled competition between member newspapers and others.
Therefore, according to the dissent, the only ground for the majority opin-
ion is "that a news gathering organization as large and efficient as AP is
engaged in a public calling and so under a duty to admit all qualified appli-
cants on equal terms."
The implications of the decision are far reaching. Heretofore it has
generally been recognized that neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton
Act imposed upon any particular business the obligation to serve without
discrimination,' although, of course, discrimination in the choice of cus-
tomers might be part of a scheme to dominate the market or suppress com-
petition and therefore unlawful for that reason. In th instant case the
Court finds no suppression of competition in the gathering of news and
apparently places its decision on the paramount interest of the public in
the widespread services of AP. This may be sound public policy, but it
is highly questionable that it can be deduced from the existing anti-trust
legislation.
Paul if. Bruton.t
i. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1915).
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
